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F ive ThisSe",,,~s: ; ------~, 
However, now a student A fee of $30 will be charged and class rank when he grad- This special examination will 
N missal of students fo r academic whose average falls within the to each student who applies to uates. constitute the only specific form 
I
:' reasons has been adopted and range of 69.00 to 70.99 inclu- take the special test. A student must take the spe· of relief for a student who has 
Iii.·. will be effective for the current sive may take the special test, An examinee who scores at cial test in the summer immedi- been dismissed for low scholar-
school year. which will be given in late least 73 .00 on the test will be ately following the year in which 
Th 1. ·d f A t h ship. This system was arrived at e po icy prov1 es or a spe- ugus eac year. allowed to continue as though he has been dismissed. ' 
cial test to be administered to The following rules govern he had passed originally. If he No student will be allowed after a careful consideration of -
I students who have been dis- the administration of the test : fails to attain a grade of at least to retest more than once. He various other alternatives, the 
missed for poor scholarship. The examination will be a 73 he will not be allowed to will not be allowed to take a Administration said. 
A student must still retain an comprehensive test containing return. second special test after failing It is felt that this system will 
average of at least 71.00 during one question from each subject any special test. Nor will he be fil 
each academic year. Any stu- that the examinee has taken dur- If a student is readmitted his allowed to take a second special provide a second chance for a 
l
,; dent whose average falls below ing the preceding year. One original grades will stand and test if he has once successfully student to demonstrate that his 
71.00 in any academic year will hour will be allowed for each be used for purposes of com- been readmitted on the basis of original grades did not truly re-
be dismissed from law school. question. puting his cumulative average a special test. fleet his ability. 




Dean Douglas Heidenreich met 
with Student Bar representatives 
and students in April to discuss 
school policies and respond to spe-
cific suggestions and complaints . 
'Tm very much in favor of this 
kind of meeting," Heidenreich 
said, "and I hope we can do it 
again next year." 
The dean invited students to 
bring their ideas to him and also to 
comment to him on the faculty's 
performance. On the latter point 
he said: 
"I might be hard on you, but 
don't let that bother you." 
Heidenreich made these re-
sponses to the following questions 
and suggestions : 
FOURTH YEAR WORK 
LOAD. Students have complained 
that the first semester of the fourth 
year involves a relatively light work 
load while the schedule is quite 
heavy during the second semester 
when graduates need to prepare for 
the July bar examinations. 
"You don't try to build your 
curriculum around preparation for 
a bar exam," the dean said. "The 
student should try to find the time 
to prepare for it." 
Special attention was devoted to 
the Moot Court course in which 
students argue one case during the 
first semester and during the second 
semester argue a second case and 
prepare one special term pleading 
and one appellate brief. 
"We devote more time to Moot 
Court than any other law school 
that I know of," Heidenreich said. 
"Some schools don't require it." 
The present Moot Court course 
is being reevaluated, he said. 
"We could make it a one semes-
ter course, an elective, or make it 
an extra curricular activity by strip-
ping out the non-essentials," he 
said. 
Heidenreich also said the special 
term pleading or the aQPellate brief 
could be moved ap to the first 
semester. 
COURSE PACE. Students com-
plained that some professors con-
qentrate excessively on portions of 
(Continued On Page 2) 
65 to Graduate June 10 
Judge Luther Youngdahl to Speak at Commencement 
The speaker at the Mitchell 
commencement this year will be 
Judge Luther Youngdahl, senior 
federal district judge for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and a former 
governor of the State of Minne-
sota. 
The graduation exercises will 
be held at 8:00 P.M. Monday, 
June 10, in the Armory of the 
College of St. Thomas. 
Sixty five graduates will receive 
J.D. or LLB. degrees. 
The graduates, their spouses, and 
parents will attend the annual grad-
uation party at the school on the 
evening of Friday, June 7, 1968. 
Honor graduates will be named 
then, awards will be granted and 
certificates of appreciation will be 
presented to persons designated by 
the graduates. 
Judge Youngdahl was awarded 
the A .B. degree from Gustavus 
Adolphus College and in 1921 re-
ceived his LLB degree from the 
Minnesota College of Law, a pred-
ecessor institution of William 
Mitchell. He served as assistant 
Because of Militar Draft 
city attorney in Minneapolis and 
practiced law there until 1930 
when he was appointed to the 
Minneapolis Municipal bench. 
Youngdahl 
He served on the Hennepin 
County District bench from 1936 
to 1942 and was an associate jus-
tice of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court from 1942 to 1947. In 1947 
he was elected governor and 
served until 1951 when he wa·s 
appointed to the United States 
District Court for the District of 
Columbia. 
Judge Youngdahl will be hon-
ored at a special luncheon Monday, 
June 10, at the Minnesota Club in 
St. Paul. The Board of Trustees, 
members of the Minnesota State 
Supreme Court, federal judges and 
other friends of the school will 
attend. 
The graduates, assuming satis-
factory completion of their school 
work: 
Lawrence E. Agerter, Marion E. 
Atkins, James V. Beal, Claude M. 
Biros, Frank W. Bonvino, John K. 
Bouquet, P aul W. Buegler, Harry 
J . Coult, Thomas E . Cronin, Dan-
iel L Ficker, Craig W. Gagnon, 
Clifford W. Gardner, Michael J. 
Garvey, William S. Glew, Edward 
J . Hance, Jerrold M. Hartke, Wil-
liam J . Hay, William J. Hennessy, 
John R. Hoffman. 
James W. Hoolihan, James J. 
Hulwi, Victor J. Johnson, Larry G. 
Jorgenson, Dorothy A. Juenemann, 
Thomas P. Kane, Stephen C. Lapa-
dat, Gerald M. Linnihan, Rita E. 
Lukes, Clifford C. Lundberg, Ron-
nie E. Mccready, Charles J. Mc-
Kusick, Hugh P. Markley, Ver-
non F. Minnis, John S. Monroe 
Jr., James R. Morris, Darrell K. 
Morse. 
Francis E. Muelken, William H. 
Muske, Thomas M. Neitge, Bruce 
A. Nemer, Nancy K. Olkon, Glen 
L Olsen, Hugh V. Plunkett 111, 
Gary L. Pringle, John D. Quinli-
van, Gerald A. Regnier, James M. 
Riley, Ronald C. Ruud, Allan P. 
Salita, William M. Schade, Neil B. 
Schulte, Neil I. Sell, Gregory V. 
Smith. 
Brian L. Solem, William D. 
Sommerness, Thomas W. Spence, 
Rodger D. S. Squires, Eugene M. 
Stapleton, Louis E. Torinus, James 
J. Tuzinski, Marinus W. Van Put-
ten, Terrance W. Vote!, Roger C. 
Wachter, Robert E. Walrath, and 
William W. Warren. 
1968-1969 Mitchell Enrollment May Decline 15 Per Cent 
The loss of military draft defer-
ments by ome Mitchell students 
and prospective tuden ts may trim 
the enrollment aex:t year by 50 
to 60 students, or 15 per cent, 
Dean Heidenreich said. 
Applications for admission are 
running behind recent years - 144 
as of Mid-May, eomparec.,t with 192 
at the same time in 1967 and 160 
in 1966. 
Registrar Jack Davies said, how-
ever, it is possible that applications 
will jump sharply late this summer 
if the draft call runs lower than 
expected. 
"Assuming that every first year 
student for whom a 103 form was 
sent to the draft board this year is 
drafted next year we would lose 
approximately 25 to 30 students 
from next year's second year class," 
Heidenreich said. "Assuming also 
that the composition of the appli-
cants for next year's entering class 
is approximately the same as the 
group that applied this year, ap-
proximately 25 to 30 students who 
would be eligible to enter school 
may, because of the removing of 
the student deferment, either not 
enroll in law school or may be 
drafted out of their first year." 
"This means that the total de-
crease in the size of our student 
body next year is likely to be 
somewhere between 50 and 60 stu-
dents, or approximately 15 per 
cent. While this is not as great as 
the decline which is expected in the 
day law schools around the coun-
try, many of whom are predicting 
a 25 to 50 per cent or eveo higher 
decline, it will still have a notice-
able effect," Dean Heidenreich said. 
"While no specific rules have 
been established by the faculty, stu-
dents who are compelled to leave 
school because of being called into 
Costs Rise, Tuiton, Too 
The tuition at William Mitchell College of Law will be increased from 
$600 a year to $700 beginning with the 1968-69 school year, Dean Douglas 
Heidenrich announced. 
The new tuition is about the average of night law schools in the couutry, 
he said. The 1967-68 national range was from about $150 to nearly $1,400 
per year, lhe dean said. Almost \ ithout exceptio.o schools charging less than 
$600 annually in 1967-68 ceceived government SIJ(>pOrl, be aid. 
The increase reflects the general increase in costs of goods and services 
and rising salaries, he said. The hike means that Mitchell, as with most 
law schools in the country, has increased its tuition 100 per cent .in the 
last 10 years. 
the service will definitely be al-
lowed to return when they com-
plete their service obligation," 
Heidenreich said. 
Lauck Leaving 
For Miami Post 
Professor Robert G . Lauck will 
join the School of Law at the Uni-
versity of Miami next fall, it was 
announced this week. 
Lauck will become director of 
admissions and counseling and as-
sume an academic appointment a~ 
well. 
Lauck joined the Mitchell fac. 
ulty in 1964 and has taught Com-
mercial Transactions, Administra. 





The retiring Student Bar Association officers and Board of Governors 
are to be commended. 
They displayed leadership, imagination and initiative during the 
1967-68 school year. Chief among their achievements are the establish-
ment of a Faculty-Student Liaison Committee and joint sponsorship with 
Phi Alpha Delta of a Career Night forum. 
It is hoped that the newly elected officers and board will carry on with 
the same leadership, imagination and initiative. Certainly they should 
pursue the goals of the Liaison Committee with vigor and responsibility. 
As for internal matters, however, it is suggested that the SBA re-
evaluate the manner in which officers are elected. 
SBA by-laws were amended in the spring of 1967 to authorize the 
election of officers by the Board of Governors instead of the student 
body. The practice is questionable. 
The case for the system is basically two-fold : 
1. The 16 members on the Board of Governors know the candidates' 
qualifications better than do the individual students. The majority electing 
the officers presumably would be inclined to work with them in harmony. 
2 . Election by the student body at large gives unequal weight to the 
large first-year class whose students don't know SBA problems as well 
as students from the smaller advanced classes. 
We recommend a new hard look at this procedure. Democracy would 
seem to require elections at large. 
Or perhaps as a compromise the students could vote on the candidates 
and bind their class representatives on the board to vote for the candidates 
the class favors. 
In any event the election process should be reexamined. 
Justice for All 
The school day always started the same way. "Good morning, Miss 
Wilson." "Good morning, class, stand and salute the flag. I pledge 
allegiance to the flag . . . one nation . . . with liberty and justice for 
all be seated." It took some of us quite a while to learn that "be seated" 
was not part of the pledge of allegiance. 
For most of us, the words tumbled out by rote and meant about as 
much as the Fa la la la la in "Deck the halls with boughs of holly." 
It might have impressed us more if the teacher just once had said 
"liberty and justice for murderers, thieves, traitors, extortioners and 
drunken bums." 
That's the lesson that needs to be taught. "All" means everybody, the 
worst and the best, and the worth of a society is to be judged by the 
way its best treat its worst. 
The school children of yesterday have turned into the world citizens 
of today, most of them. Some became reprobates. The latter are just as 
much entitled to the Bill of Rights as the solid citizens - and ever so 
much more in need of it. The popular sentiment seems to be that only 
nice people ought to be protected by the constitutional guarantees. The 
line of Supreme Court decisions re-affirming the right of all individuals 
to be defended against the imprisoning power of the state has drawn great 
outcry from nice people who know they'll never need to take the Fifth, 
and are confident that an illegal search of their homes would not turn 
up drugs, or guns or dirty pictures. 
Ibey have a poin t. The innocent sbould be protected and the guilty 
-should be punished. The question is: how should the tate proceed to 
determine who is guilty? There are ome fin e people in jail in Greece, in 
prison in Cuba, dead in Haiti, or vanished forever behind the Iron 
Curtain. They were nice folks, until the State said they weren't. 
There is no innocence in this world unless the individual has the right 
to assert his innocence and compel the state to prove otherwise to his 
fellow men. That is what the Supreme Court is saying, and that is the 
principle which lawyers should be defending. 
1l is a orry sight to see a pro ecuting attorney, who is a )av er and 
ough t to k:no\v better, complain in the _newspapers that criminal.s are being 
coddled by the very Constitution the pro ecutors are ·worn co u phold. 
Tt a,bout time for the legal profession to realize just what John Donne 
meant when he wrote, "Ask not for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee." 
To deny due process to any man is to deny it to ourselves, and to our 
ch ildren. To give full constitutional rights to Gideon, to Escobedo, 
fi ran.da, Malloy and Mapp is to give them the rights we want preserved 
for ourselves. 
pevack. held that even a lawyer couJd in oke the Fifth; and Gau Lt 
held that a child bould not be imprisoned more ca ·ually than a man. 
There, are .no econd class citizens left - except; perhaps our m en in 
military ernce who are drafted away from h ome. fami ly work and 
o~en due proeess. 'For all" includes oldie.rs sailors, marines and air-
men, too. 
The words .are not really; "with liberty and justice for alJ be seated."' 
The words are "with liberty and justice for ALL.' After lhose words. 
cve_ryo.ne in the class - and the country - should be told to Stand. up 
a nd be eounted." 
Reprinted from Trial, publication of the American Trial Lawyers Association 
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Dicta From the Dean 
Mitchell's Moot Court Unique 
BY DOUGLAS HEIDENREICH 
A study of the catalogs of vari-
ous law schools throughout the 
country will quickly confirm the 
fact that William Mitchell 's Moot 
Court program is unique. 
It is unusual to devote a total of 
four classroom hours each semester 
to the Moot Court program. Fur-
thermore, it is unusual to require 
the amount of trial work called for 
by William Mitch ell 's program. 
Each taden t in the program par-
ticipates in two mock trjal which 
are as close to the real thing as it 
is pos ible to get and to prepare 
briefs for and to argue one appeal . 
T he truly unique thing about 
the program is the participation in 
the program by lawyers and judges 
from the Supreme Court level on 
down. Each year 20 or more law-
yers and judges participate in the 
program by lecturing to students in 
the course and serving as trial or 
appellate judges. These people are 
without exception well versed and 
thoroughly experienced in the field 
of trial work. 
It is particularly gratifying to be 
able to call upon men who are ac-
knO\ ledged national experts in 
trial work. Most of the lawyers 
ho lecture ro the Moot Court pro-
gram are members of the Ameri-
can Trial Lawyers Association; 
several are fellows of the American 
College of Trial Lawyers or the 
International Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. The array of talent which 
is displayed for our students in this 
program could not be bough1 at 
any priee; yet these men genero u ]y 
consent to give of their time ye&r 
after year without payment. 
Dean Heidenreich 
The highlight of the year in the 
Moot Court program is the appear-
ance by four selected students be-
fore the Supreme Court of the State 
of Minn ota. T he four particip-ants 
who h ave been selected by their 
cla. smates prepare briefs and argu-
ments based on a set of facts pre-
pared by Judge Hachey and Mr. 
Gislason. 
The case usually involves points 
of law which have not been settled 
in Minnesota and a great deal of 
re earch goes into the preparation 
of i.hi material . atura!Jy the stu-
dents who are able to argue the 
case before the court gain the most 
advantage from it; however the 
other members of the class who 
attend the oral argument and listen 
to the discussion and criticism de-
livered afterwards by some of the 
members of the bench also receive 
Dean Meets With SBA, 
Students on Policy 
(Continued From Page 1) gested that both the class ranking 
course material and then skip system and the grading y tem be 
hastily over other areas. aboli hed. Boch. tend to pr essure 
"If you are assigned to read 50 srudents t o wor k toward a hiob 
pages a week and don't and you score rather than toward Jea~g 
haven't read them when the pro- the law it was su e:gested . 
f~ssor jumps ahead, you haven't "Class ranking is of some value 
hved up . to y~ur re~ponsibilities," to the students," Heidenreich said. 
Dean He1denre1ch said. "Employers ask for them." 
. "The function of the law school "I don't agrtt with getting rid 
1s to teach the student how to read of grades. The wading process is 
the law and figure it out for him- at best an educated guess. But when 
self. Someone who sits there and education people study these things 
asks for someone to feed it to him they find a 'remarkable correlation 
shouldn't be here." between scholarship and grades." 
The dean said professors fre- THIRD YEAR EXAM SCHED-
quently concentrate on various ULE. Three weeks are provided 
areas in a course by design. fo;r examinations this year. The 
"Class discussion is not essential third-year exams are bunched at 
to learning the material," he said. the end of the period- Friday, 
FACULTY EVALUATION. It Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. 
has been suggested that students "The schedule for this year won't 
grade each professor after comp!et- be changed," Heidenreich said. "I 
ing a course, with the results of the tried to spread them out over the 
grading given exclusively to the in- three-week period, consistent with 
dividual professor for his guidance. all other considerations. I don't 
"I'm not interested in popularity think I'll do it this way next year." 
contests," Dean Heidenreich said. COMMENCEMENT. The com-
"More often than not, I'm afraid, mencement exerci'ses will be on a 
the actual result is just the opposite Monday night, while students sug-
(of student evaluation) ." gested that families would be better 
"I don't think there is a relation- able to attend during a weekend. 
ship between bar exam results and 
what you think is the quality of the 
instruction." 
APP ARENT GRADE DELAY. 
Students have complained that pro-
fessors take too long in grading 
examinations. 
"I'm not sure anything can be 
done," Heidenreich said. "I exert 
as much pressure on the faculty as 
I can to get the grad·es in." 
He said he was more concerned 
about delays on the second semes-
ter grades than on the first semester 
grades "because those who are not 
coming back should know as soon 
as possible." 
CLASS RANKING. It was sug-
Speakers prefer a Monday or 
Friday, Heidenreich said. He also 
said a change would be considered 
next year. 
Plunkett to Address 
Annual Senior Party 
Hugh V. Plunkett, Jr., senior 
partner in the Austin, Minn., law 
firm of Plunkett and Plunkett and 
the father of graduating senior 
Hugh V. Plunkett III, will address 
the graduating seniors and their 
wives at the annual senior party to 
be held in the school on Friday, 
June 7. 
an unparalleled opportunity to see 
the court in action. 
Many young lawyers who have 
been out of school for only a year 
or two may find themselves arguing 
cases before the Supreme Court. 
This brief exposure to the court 
during law school stands them in 
good stead. Any trial lawyer would 
quickly seize the opportunity to 
have judges of our Supreme Court 
discuss and criticize his work but 
seldom does the opportunity pre-
sent itself. Our students all have 
this chance before they complete 
their Jaw school careers. 
It is program of this type to 
which WllHam Mitchell poiots with 
pr ide. Of cour e we always strive 
for perfeetion jn the tradition-al 
academic areas. We constantly _eek 
to jmprove the quality and tech-
nique of our clas room instl'Uction. 
We have through expansion and 
adjustment of the curriculum 
sought to enrich the program avail-
able to the William Mitchell stu-
dents. 
However it is in courses such as 
the Moot Court program that we 
can offer him something truly un-
usual. Practicing lawyers take valu-
able days away from their practice 
and spend substantial amounts of 
money to attend the programs in 
which they listen to discussions and 
watch demonstrations presented by 
the same experts who provide this 
valuable training to our students as 
part of their academic work. It is 
only after a student leaves school 
that he discovers how important 
and how helpful this opportunity 
can be. 
Law Wives In 
Fund Drive 
William Mitchell Law Wives 
concluded a year of activities ear-
lier this month and immediately 
launched plans for the coming 
year's fund-raising project. 
Mrs. Julius Gemes was elected 
president for the 1968-69 school 
year at a potl uck supper May 1. 
Retiring president is Mrs. Gerald 
Regnier. 
Other new officers are Mrs. Dan-
iel Byrne, vice president and pro-
gram chainnan; Mrs. J. Lance 
Jacobson, corresponding secretary· 
Mrs. Robert A.hi, recording secrc-
t.ary· Mr ·. George Olds, treasurer; 
Mrs. Gerald !\1cManu hospitality 
chairman; Mn;. Robert Christian-
son, publicity chainnan; and Mrs. 
Earl Gray, social chairman. 
Continuing until December as 
board members at large are Mrs. 
Ben Brunsvold, Mrs. Robert 
Hoene, Mrs. Bruce Leier and Mrs. 
Clinton McLagan. 
Mrs. Gemes has announced that 
members of the Law Wives group 
will work at Target stores in 
Bloomington and Har Mar Mall 
on the evening of Sunday, June 23. 
Profits from this evening of inven-
tory work will go to the cholarship 
fund of William Mitchell College 
of Law. All wives of Wi-Uiam 
Mitchell students are asked to con-
tribute their time on Tm-get-Schol-
ar hip Day. Chairmen of this proj-
ect are Mrs. Robert H eotge and 
Mrs. :Brunsvold_ 
Law Wives will provide four 
$200 scliolarsbi.ps for the 1968·69 
school year, one for a second, third 
and fourth year student and one to 
go to a minority student. Money 
for these cbo]arsh.ips was acquired 
from the sale of two sets of original 
prints during the year and the 
group's annual dance and style 
show. 
On Friday, June 7, third year 
law wives will hostess a buffet for 
the graduating senior students and 
their families. Mrs. John Owen is 
chairman of this annual event. 
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Role of Non-Obviousness in Patent Law 
By BRUCE A. NEMER 
The United States Supreme Court added 
a new dimension to the Patent Law in 1966 
in the case of Graham v. John Deere.I That 
case offered the Court an opportunity to first 
construe Section 103 of the Patent Law and 
to determine the meaning of the word 
obvious within it. 2 The construction made by 
the Court added a new patentability test of 
non-obviousness to the previously existing 
patentability tests of novelty and utility -
the sole statutory tests since the Patent Act 
of 1793.3 
Section 103 reads, in part: 
"Condition for patentability; non-obvious 
subject matter. 
"A patent may not be obtained . . . if 
the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be 
negatived by the manner in which the inven-
tion was made." 4 
Prior to Graham, two main and diamet-
rically opposed arguments as to the meaning 
and purposes of Section 103 divided Patent 
Law practitioners. Congress intended Section 
103 to sweep away judicial precedents and 
lower the level of patentability, argued one 
group of practitioners. The other group re-
sponded: Congress intended Section 103 to 
codify the essential purposes of judicial prece-
dents and reject insignificant variations and 
innovations as unpatentable. 
The intent of Congress in codifying the 
second sentence of Section 103 quoted above 
reinforced the argument for a construction 
sweeping away judicial precedents and lower-
ing the level of patentability. The second 
sentence abolished the oppressive "flash of 
genius" test formulated in Cuno Corp. v. 
Automatic Devices Corp. and admittedly 
lowered the level of patentability. 5 The argu-
ment was: Because of the purpose of this 
sentence of Section 103, Congress must have 
intended both sentences of Section 103 to 
sweep away judicial precedents and lower 
the level of patentability. 
The Reviser's Note to Section 1036 sup-
ported the contrary argument that Congress 
intended a construction adopting the essen-
tial purposes of judicial precedents and 
rejecting insignificant variations as unpatent-
able. That note strongly implies an adoption 
of the basic philosophy expressed in Hotch-
kiss v. Greenwood 7 where the Court stated 
the test as: 
1 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 
1, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966). Calmar, 
Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. was consolidated with Gra-
ham. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 15 L. Ed. 
2d 572, 148 U.S.P.Q. 479 (1966) was decided with 
Graham upon the same basis. A separate opinion for 
Adams was necessitated by subsidiary issues in that case 
which were disposed of before the case was treated on 
its merits. 
"The Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 798, Title 35, codi-
fied various scattered patent laws and some judicial pre-
cedents for the first time. Section 103 was new. 
"The Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318, reads in 
part: 
... that when any person or persons, being a citizen 
or citizens of the United States, shall allege that he 
or they have invented any new and useful art, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter ... 
Letters Patent ... delivered to the patentee or his 
order. ( emphasis added) 
Novelty and utility are still tests under the 1952 Patent 
Act. 35 U.S.C. Section 101 entitled "Inventions Patent-
able" reads in part: 
"Unless more ingenuity and skill ... 
were required than were possessed by an 
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the busi-
ness, there was an absence of that degree of 
skill and ingenuity which constitute essential 
elements of every invention. In other words, 
the improvement is the work of a skilled 
mechanic, not that of the inventor." At 
p. 267. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled: 
the first sentence of Section 103 added the 
test of non-obviousness to the previously 
existing patentability tests of novelty and 
utility; and Congress intended Section 103 to 
codify the essential purposes of judicial 
precedents including Hotchkiss. 8 Advances 
in the art of an ordinary nature are not 
patentable. 
The Court also set out a procedure for 
applying the non-obviousness test of patent-
ability. 9 The steps are: 
(1) determine the scope and content of 
the pertinent prior art; 
(2) determine the differences between the 
pertinent prior art and the subject matter 
sought to be patented; 
(3) determine the level of ordinary skill in 
the pertinent art; and 
(4) determine if the differences between 
the prior art and subject matter sought to be 
patented would have been non-obvious to 
one having ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 
These questions are to be applied to condi-
tions existing at the time the invention was 
made. 
The intent of Congress was to direct the 
focus of the inquiry away from the previously 
used subjective test, Is an invention present? 
and to the more objective test, Is the subject 
matter sought to be patented non-obvious in 
view of the prior art? By this change, Con-
gress intended to enhance the certainty of 
the patentability investigation basically stated 
in Hotchkiss and give it a new practicality. 
For the basis of the new patentability test 
of non-obviousness, the Court directly inter-
preted Section 103 in the light of the source 
of all federal patent power - the United 
States Constitution, Article I Section 8, read-
ing in part: 
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
Promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to . . . In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries." 
The Court views this clause as both a 
grant of power and a limitation. It is a grant 
in authorizing the limited monopoly of a 
patent, and it is a limitation in the manner 
the power may be exercised. 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, or manufacture, or composition of 
matter ... may obtain a patent therefor ... (em-
phasis added) 
'The Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 798, 35 U.S.C. 103. 
5 314 U.S. 84, 91; 51 U.S.P.Q. 272, 275 (1941) where 
the court said: 
The new device, however useful it may be, must re-
veal the flash of creative genius, and not merely the 
skill of the calling, 
This test demanded an instantaneous creative "spark" 
or "flash" and had consistently been used to void patents 
where the invention was made by a carefully planned 
and organized research program. 
o That note reads: 
There is no provision corresponding to the first sen-
tence explicitly in the present statutes, but the refusal 
of patents by the Patent Office, and the holding of 
patents invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack 
of invention or lack of patentable novelty has been 
followed since at least as early as 1850. This para-
graph is added with the view that an explicit state-
ment in the statute may have some stabilizing effect, 
"The Congress in the exercise of the 
patent power may not overreach the re-
straints imposed by the stated constitutional 
purpose." 10 
The constitutional restraint on the federal 
patent power which forms the basis for the 
non-obviousness test is found in an expansion 
of the word promote within Article I Sec-
tion 8.11 In the words of the Court: 
"The patent monopoly was not designed to 
secure to the inventor his natural right in his 
discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an in-
ducement, to bring forth new knowledge.12 
. . . The inlierent problem was to develop 
some means of weeding out those inventions 
which would not be disclosed or devised but 
for the inducement of a patent.13" (emphasis 
added) 
If no inducement is necessary to bring 
forth new knowledge, patent protection is 
not necessary to promote the useful arts. 
Under the constitutional restraints, uniess 
patent protection is necessary to promote the 
useful arts, no patent may be granted. 
Obvious subject matter - that within the 
ability of one having ordinary skill in the 
art 14 closest to the subject matter sought to 
be patented - does not need the inducement 
of a patent. Obvious subject matter would 
be disclosed naturally, without the induce-
ment of a patent, when a practitioner of the 
art has a need or use for it. It would be dis-
closed naturally since, by definition, it is 
generally within the ability of common 
practitioners of the art. 
Thus, even though the knowledge is new 
in the sense of not being previously publicly 
disclosed, if it is within the ordinary skill 
of common practitioners in the art, it does 
not fall within the area set out by the con-
stitutional restraints on the federal patent 
power. It should be "weeded out." 15 To merit 
a patent, it must be non-obvious in addition 
to being new. The reward of a patent is given 
only for a public disclosure which promotes 
the useful arts, and a public disclosure 
which is already within the ordinary skill of 
common practitioners in the art does not 
promote the useful arts. 
After construfag Section 103 to add a new 
test of non-obviousness and presenting a four-
step procedure for applying the test, the Court 
went on to three examples of its use. The 
test was applied to determine the validity of 
the three patents in the three cases before 
it.16 
Two of the patents, to an improved plow 
and for a shipping cap to a sprayer dis-
penser, were considered together.17 In both 
cases prior art was determined, and the 
differences between the prior art and the 
patents were noted. In both cases the prior 
and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a 
later time of some criteria which may be worked out. 
The second sentence states that patentability as to 
this requirement is not to be negatived by the manner 
in which the invention was made, that is, it is im-
material whether it resulted from long toil and ex-
perimentation or from a flash of genius. House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Revision of Title 35, United States 
Code, H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. 18 
(1952). 
7 11 How. 248; 52 U.S. 248 (18501 . 
'383 U.S. at 17; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 466. 
"383 U.S. at 17; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 467. 
10 383 U.S. at 5; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 462. 
11 The other two patentability tests - utility and novel-
ty - are also derived from words in Article I Section 
8 of th~ Uni1e_il. States Constitution. The test of utility 
derives from the word useful. The test of novelty derives 
from D iscoveries. 
"'383 U.S. at 9: 148 U.S.P.Q. at 463. 
"' 383 U.S. at 11; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 464. 
H The words "ordinary ski11 in the art" appear in 
art was close; the patents attempted to cover 
small improvements to existing structure. 
The Supreme Court determined that the sub-
ject matter of both patents was obvious 
under Section 103. Both patents were held 
invalid.18 
In the case of the plow patent, the inventor 
knew of the prior art. In the case of the 
dispenser cap patent, however, the inventor 
did not know of the existence of the prior 
art. The Court charged both inventors with 
knowledge of the prior art and admonished 
them to begin a well-organized research 
program by searching patent files.19 
The result reached by the Court in apply-
ing the new test expresses a policy decision 
to disfavor small improvements as not falling 
within the "patent umbrella" and not being 
"worth to the public the embarrassment of 
an exclusive patent," as Thomas Jefferson 
stated it.20 The Court said: 
" ... we conclude here that the inquiry 
which the Patent Office and the Courts must 
make as to patentability must be beamed 
with greater intensity on the requirements of 
[Section] 103 ... " 21 
Next, a patent for a new battery came 
under the Court's scrutiny.22 While the bat-
tery was composed of parts individually 
taught by the prior art, no prior art found 
taught the particular combination of parts 
patented. No prior art found explained the 
battery action of the particular combination 
of parts patented either. In fact, teachings of 
the prior art negated the possibility that the 
patented combination of parts would function 
as a battery. 
The Court emphasized the unexpected re-
sults of the patented combination of parts. 
It also emphasized the deterrent effect the 
prior art teachings would have on a possible 
inventor. A possible inventor would have to 
experiment in the face of teachings negating 
his final result. He would have to overcome 
prior art teachings to reach his result. The 
subject matter of the battery patent was held 
non-obvious over the pertinent prior art; the 
validity of the patent was upheld.23 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
has added non-obviousness to novelty and 
utility as tests of patentability. The court 
reasons from Article I Section 8 of the 
United States Constitution which grants 
authority to create a patent system "to pro-
mote the progress of ... useful arts ... " 
that obvious subject matter does not promote 
the progress of the useful arts. Therefore, 
subject matter must be non-obvious to be 
patentable. 
Section 103. These are words of art in Patent Law and 
are used in much the same way the reasonable and 
prudent man is used in Tort Law. 
1a Supra, Note 13. 
10 Patent number 2,627,798 was issued to William T. 
Graham in 1953 for an improved chisel plow; patent 
number 2,870,943 was issued to Baxter I. Scoggin, Jr. 
and his assignee, Cook Chemical, in 1959 for a shipping 
cap to a sprayer dispenser ( drawings of both of these 
potents awenr in the case st.3.rting 383 U.S. at 38. 148 
U.S,P.Q. ·at 4:7 S); and pciterit .nomber 2,332,2]{) .wi)s is-
sued 10 Bert N . Adams in ,1943 for an imprm•ed. bat-
tery. 
" Number 2,627,798 issued to Graham and number 
2,870,943 issued to Scoggin, Jr. 
1s 383 U.S. at 26, 37; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 470, 474. 
'"383 U.S. at 36; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 474. 
"° Letter to Isaac McPherson, VI Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, (Washington ed.) at 181 (1814). 
"'383 U.S. at 19; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 467. 
2 2 Number 2,332,210 issued to Adams. 
""383 U.S. at 52; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 483. 
Venture Called 'Encoura{?infl ALUMNI BRIEFS 
Liaison Committee Probes Complaints 
The newly formed Student-Fac-
ulty Liaison Committee reviewed 
several areas of student concern 
during a series of meetings this 
semester. 
Included m the discussions were 
grades, testing procedures and writ-
ing techniques, test scheduling, con-
flicts in scheduling make-up classes 
and participation of students on 
faculty committees. These and 
other matters will be discussed next 
school year. 
One concrete result has been 
reached. At the suggestion of the 
students, faculty members now are 
posting the range of grades for 
courses so the student can deter-
mine how well he scored in rela-
tionship with the enti.re class. 
In discussing the grading system, 
students said the marks were 
grouped too closely in the C range 
of 71-79 and nearly the entire stu-
dent body falls in that range. Fac-
ulty members replied that grades 
are relative to each other and the 
significant factor in school transfer 
or job seeking is the class rank. 
Faculty members also indicated, 
however, the subject will be dis-
cussed at a faculty committee and 
some consideration might be given 
to lowering the B grade down into 
the high 70s. 
Donald Day, second year, stu-
dent chairman who presides over 
the informal meetings, said the 
committee examined the sugges-
tions proposed in an editorial in the 
January, 1968, issue of the Opinion. 
"There is general agreement that 
students should not remain an un-
tapped source," Day said. "Under 
consideration is a proposal to have 
students sit on faculty committees 
to give student views on such mat-
ters as admissions, curriculum, 
testing, grades, and appeals of dis-
missals," Day said. 
'To date, the venture has been 
encouraging," Day said. "With the 
committee's embryonic stage past, 
it is expected that next year it will 
mature fully into a useful instru-
ment promoting better student-
faculty communications and har-
mony." 
1930 
WILLIAM H. DEPARCQ has 
joined with Jerome T. Anderson 
and Norman Perl in the formation 
of DeParcq, Anderson & Perl. The 
partnership is located in the North-
star Center, Minneapolis. 
1953 
CLAYTON E. NARVESON has 
ioined Weis and Frauenshuh in the 
general practice of law at Paynes-
ville, Minn. 
1957 
RICHARD I. ROSE has been 
named senior vice president of 
Midland National Bank, Minne-
apolis. 
VERNON E. BERGSTROM has 
been appointed by the Idaho Su-
preme Court to be the court's ad-
ministrative assistant. 
1959 
BRUCE A. POULSEN has been 
named an associate counsel in the 
law department of Prudential Insur-
ance Co., Minneapolis. 
1963 
JAMES L. WALSH has joined 
Oppenheimer, Hodgson, Brown, 
Wolff and Leach, First National 
Bank Building, St. Paul. 
1964 
NEIL P. CONVERY, former as-
sistant United States district attor-
ney, has joint Smith, Blomquest, 
Wilson & Vitko, First National 
Bank Building, St. Paul. 
1966 
DEWEY NELSON has joined 
with James Martin in the formation 
of Martin and Nelson at Morris, 
Minn. 
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Evidence of Other Crimes in Criminal Trials 
By WILLIAM J. HAY 
Generally in Minnesota,1 as elsewhere in 
the United States, "upon the trial of a crimi-
nal case, evidence of the commission of 
other lndependent and unrelated crimes by 
the defendant is inadmissible to show either 
guilt or that the defendant would be Likely 
to commit the crimes with which he is 
charged." 2 
The exclusionary rule is applied subject to 
widely recognized exceptions. 3 Evidence of 
other offenses is admissible in Minnesota to 
establish motive, intent, absence of mistake 
or accident, identity of the defendant, or a 
common scheme or plan.4 The exceptions 
are liberally interpreted where sex offenses 
are involved. 5 
While expanding gently the scope of the 
exception which allows proof of other 
offenses as part of a common scheme or 
plan,6 the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
State v. Spreigl nevertheless announced a 
singular procedural safeguard to help assure 
the defendant a fair trial. Henceforth in 
Minnesota criminal cases the state must give 
the defendant written notice of any other 
offenses which the state will seek to prove 
under the exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule.7 
In 1962 Theodore Spreigl was tried for 
and found guilty of taking indecent liberties 
with his 11 year old stepdaughter, Sandra, 
in what amounted to an unaccomplished act 
of sexual intercourse. Sandra was allowed to 
testify as to other sexual offenses committed 
upon her during the course of the previous 
year. The defendant was not charged with 
these latter offenses. Two other stepchildren, 
a boy and girl, both IO years of age, were 
allowed to testify as to numerous sexual 
molestations by the defendant occurring over 
an indefinite period of time, but all occurring 
at least a month before the offense charged. 
Two of the tliree children made no com-
plaint about the defendant's alleged conduct 
uotil after the offense for which the defendant 
was charged. The third never complained. 
The defendant did not appear as a witness on 
his own behalf. The failure of the trial court 
to exclude the testimony of the three children 
as to prior offenses was assigned as error. The 
Supreme Court ruled that receiving such tes-
timony without giving the defendant prior 
notice of the state's intention to use it was 
error. A new trial was ordered. The decision 
hinged upon 
" .. . whether the unquestioned relevance 
of testimony that a defendant has committed 
other sex offenses, if true, gives it sufficient 
probative value to outweigh the patent un-
t tb.U: , ,. Spreigl, 272 Linn. 48 • 490. 139 N .W.2d 
167, 1.69, (l 965). 
"J >\'harfon, Criminal Lnw ~ US, nt. 492-94- ( 121h ed. 
19S5). 
• / ti. ~ 233, ;:i:t 49S-99. 
" Tt:i<> rule prohibiting cvidehce of the commission of 
other crimes ·is subject to twe major exceptions, (1) 
Proof of the commission of another crime 1l p roper 
whenever a. statute provjdes for the enhancc.ment of. 
lilt defendant's punishment i( he is n former of-
fender . . • (2 ) Proof of an !ndeyendent crime is 
a.dmj~~ible if it is re.lcvant to the proof of the guilt 
of, lhe defendant for the crime with wbkh. he is 
chac.ged .'' · 
• 272 finn. a t '191, 1.39 .w:2d at 169. 
~ tate v. weeney, 180 ,\II.inn. -160. 455, 2'~1 .W. 225 
.1.27 ( 19:lO) • 
• l Jnfil pccigl v. State the court had not held that 
t v:idcnce of offenses mcn:.ly simhar in n.ature, not 
tdenti'<,i!, committed upon seJ)1ln1.te victim · is ndmisslb!c. 
!{ere the court ruled that such evidence should be ad-
mjl1l,d at the new- trial. 
• 272 ~n- a.t 496. 139 . W.2d at 173. 
· ' ... rWJherc the state seeks to prove that an accused 
has been 11!1ilty of additional crime.~ and miscon duct 
on other QCC.t.Sion~. all.bou~ such -evidcnc~ ·fs. other-
wise admissible · under some C!l<ception to the general 
e,ccl11sfonary · rule. it shall not hl>reaftcr be recelvcd 
unle),S. within a reasonn.ble time befo,c [rfuJ the state: 
furnishes defcmfanf in writing_ a sfruement of the 
ofit:nSes it i,ntends ro sbow he has committed. de-
Fraternity Membership Grows 
fairness which results to an innocent de-
fendant who is confronted with charges 
against which he is not prepared to defend, 
which are inflammatory in the extreme, and 
which emanate from witnesses who are mani-
festly susceptible to influence and sugges-
tion." s 
What about Spreigl caused the Supreme 
Court to require the state to begin giving 
notice of its intention to use evidence of 
other crimes in subsequent criminal trials? 
The court indicates that "threaded through 
our precedents dealing with the exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule is a note of concern, 
admonishing courts against depriving inno-
cent persons of their right to a fair trial." 9 
This constitutional concern is meant to pre-
vent the defendant from being deprived of a 
fair trial by being deprived of notice of the 
charges against which he must defend.10 
Spreigl presented the court with the op-
portunity of reevaluating its prior decisions 
regarding the admissibility of evidence of 
other offenses as part of a common scheme 
or plan. Until 1955 whenever evidence of 
other crimes was sought to be justified as 
part of a common scheme or plan, it was 
required that "[s]ome connection between 
the crimes must be shown to have existed in 
fact and in the mind of the defendant, unit-
ing them for the accomplishment of a com-
mon purpose, before such evidence can be 
received." 11 In other words, it had to be 
shown that the offenses were not separate 
and independent. 
If the offenses are connected in fact and 
in the defendant's mind, the defendant can 
reasonably expect to be confronted with both 
offenses and can reasonably be expected to 
prepare to defend against both. Before 1955 
no formal notice that the state would intro-
duce evidence of other offenses as part of a 
common scheme or plan was necessary to 
protect the defendant from having to defend 
against the proof of other offenses. If the 
offenses were not so connected that he could 
safely be assumed to have notice, the evi-
dence was inadmissible. However, in 1955 in 
State v. D ePauw,12 the Supreme Court re-
defined the common-scheme-or-plan concept 
to include other offeo e which are of a 
common pattern with the offense charged.rn 
Somehow the court felt that evidence of a 
common pattern of offenses is not the same 
as evidence of a propensity to commit such 
offenses. One wonders how the court escaped 
the recognition that to show a pattern com-
mon to several offenses without showing a 
connection in fact or in the mind of the 
offender is to show circumstantially that it is 
SCTibed with the partlculnrily required or :m indict-
ment or i:nfommtiiln. subject to @ :- following exci,p-
tions : (a) Offenses wll ich are p:!rt of the immediale-
epi ode for which the defendant is being tried ; (b) 
offenses for which defenda-nt has previOu"1y been 
prQsecuted: and (c) offenses wl1ioh are introduced 
to rebut. defcend:lnt's evidence of good ohnractcr." 
' I d. at 490. 139 N .W.2d- ,n 169. 
h Id. at 49S. 139 .W .ld at .171. 
10 State v. Austin, 74 Minn. 463, 464, 77 N.W. 301 , 
302, (1898) . 
·To a,dmit _evidence of another criminal :ict would be 
to oppress a defendru,t_ by try{ng him !or an oficn.~e 
of w.bich he has no notice, and [or .. ,h teh he .is un-
prepared, and, freq urntly, to prejudice him in the 
eyes of the jury. n 
Sta te v. Fitcbem,. ij8 Mlnn. 145_; 147, 92 N .W. S27, 
S28 (19{}2). 
'"He ls illso ~titled to bee inf-0rm..-<l of lhe precise 
charge he is to meet, that he mny prepare for trlal. 
These rig.hts are secured by constiturioual sanctions 
and sho.uJd be efficiently guarded by the courts." 
" 180 1'jinn. at 4.55, 231 N.W. at 221. 
~246 Minn. 91. 74.N.W.2d 297 (1.955). 
•• Id. a t 95, 74 . W .2d_ at 300. 
' '\Vhile a ·col)l1l)On scheme or plan' is not too -well 
ddlned, ft would nevertheless s.eem that, where we 
have a common pattern as disclo$cd by the eYidence 
here, it would hardly do violence to the ·exccplio·n to 
th e geheral rnle to recoJ1Di~e that I.be defendant bad a 
purpose of a busing smaU childrta in his neighborhood 
likely that the offenses were committed by the 
same person. That is, that the offender has a 
propensity to commit such offenses. 
In Spreigl the court recognizes how far it 
had gone in redefining the common-scheme-
or-plan concept.H But it also recognizes that 
a propensity to sin may very well be relevant 
in a trial for like sins. ". . . [A] basic as-
sumption implicit in decisions which permit a 
showing of prior sex offenses is that sex 
offenders have ao established proclivity for 
recidivism." 15 Yet to admit evidence of other 
offenses which are separate and independent 
from that charged, however relevant, is to 
render more possible the principal evil against 
which the exclusionary rule is aimed - that 
the jury may find guilt oo the basis of the 
other offenses.16 The possibility that the de-
fendant will be convicted of ao offense other 
than that charged is at least reduced when the 
defendant is made aware that the state in-
tends to use the other offenses in evidence 
against him. 
By the very breadth of the notice require-
ment 11 the court seems to be giving tacit 
recognition to the patent unfairness of ever 
receiving evidence of uncharged offenses if 
the uncharged offenses are not so related to 
the offense charged as to be part of it. 
Is the exclusionary rule merely a rule of 
evidence? 1 s Or, is there good reason for the 
Minnesota court to concern itself with the 
possibility of an infringement of the de-
fendant's constitutional rights when proof of 
separate and independent uncharged offenses 
is offered into evidence as part of the prose-
cution; and good reason for imposing the 
requirement of pretrial notice? 
"It is a fundamental principle of proce-
dural due process that one cannot be con-
victed of a crime of which he is not ac-
cussed . . . " 19 This proposition does not, of 
course, apply to conviction of a lesser of-
fense, the elements of which are included 
within the elements of the more serious 
offense with which the defendant is charged. 
If conviction under a defective indictment 
is a violation of procedural due process be-
cause the defendant is not adequately "in· 
formed of the nature and cause of the accusa· 
tion," 20, how can there be any less a violation 
of procedural due process when a jury is per· 
mitted to convict the defendant of uncharged 
offenses which the defendant has no reason to 
believe will be offered into evidence against 
him? There cannot. To conclude otherwise 
would be to require the defendant always to 
prepare to defend against every bad act it 
is possible to accuse him of. He must be pre-
pared to defend his life history, and perhaps 
even his character.21 
Each time evidence of separate and inde-
pendent uncharged offenses is received at 
trial, it is possible that the jury will convict 
while th ey were in his house." (emphasis supplied ) 
H 272 Minn. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 171. 
"In permitting evidence of other offenses to be re-
ceived as a part of a common plan or scheme. we 
have come perilously close to p utting the deftndant 's 
allarncter :md r<cord in issue notwithstanding his 
failure to tnke the wttnei· · stand •• . " 
1; Id. at 493, 139 N .W.2d at 170. 
in See 1 Wigmore. Evidence § 194. at 650 (3d ed. 
1940). 
I'i Supra , note 7. 
•• Baltimore Rai11o Show. Inc. v. tute. 193 Md. 300, 
67 A.2d -197 ( 1949) ; cert. dtmied M:uylru!d v. Baltimore 
Rndio Sbow. Inc .. 33 .S. 912 (1950). Here trial court 
,~sued crimfnal contempt cilations 10 thrci: radio broad• 
cast conipanies, holding that their sensationalized cover-
age of a ch ild s laying dq,rived the acc)Jsed killer of a ny 
ch:mce for a fafr trial Oo appeal lhl: M3cy.Iand SupTem.e 
Court .reversed. h olding that (among other lhings) even 
if evidence of the accused killer's prior crimes was 
brought to the jury by tlie sensational pretrial publicity, 
the constitutional rights of the accused were not violated 
because 
" [w]ithout questioning the soundness of the rule of 
exclusion prior to verdictl it remains a rule of evi-
dence. noL a corrstltutionaJ rii;,ht." 
Had certiorari 110! been ·denied, it is probable that the 
uprcme Court would nor have de,ided the particular 
issue we nre concerned with hero. I t lacked the rcqui.\rtc 
:~ripeness.,. -
1.1) Scott, A Fair Trial for the Accused: Fairness in 
of the uncharged offenses. But, as the court 
points out in Spreigl, proof of the uncharged 
offenses may be relevant to proof of the 
offenses charged.22 The principles of fairness 
and justice which demand the defendant 
have notice of the offenses that will be 
proved against him 23 do not require the 
state forgo the use of relevant evidence 
merely because it consists of proof of 
separate and unrelated offenses. 
The United States Supreme Court has yet 
to decide whether in a criminal prosecution 
the state is precluded constitutionally from 
offering in evidence proof of separate and 
independent uncharged offenses. There is 
dictum in Michigan v. United States which 
indicates such evidence is inadmissible even 
though it be relevant to proof of guilt of the 
offense charged.24 If the question is ever put 
squarely before it, the United States Supreme 
Court might decide, as the Supreme Court 
of Oregon decided in 1914, that the infringe-
ment of constitutional rights "might be 
palliated if there was any provision for 
giving the defendant notice of the other 
charges .... " 25 
There is some indication of the direction 
in which the Minnesota court is moving in 
its most recent decision regarding the ad-
missibility of evidence of separate and 
independent uncharged offenses, State v. 
Billstrom.26 Here the court clarifies the 
notice requirement by adding that : (a) In its 
written notice the state must specify which 
exception to the general. exclusionary rule it 
will rely on; (b) though the evidence need 
not prove the other offense beyond reason-
able doubt, proof of them must be clear and 
convincing; (c) evidence of other offenses 
which is 'merely cumulative and a ubteriuge 
for impugning the defendant's character'' is 
inadmissible; and (d) the trial court must 
instruct the jury in unequivocal terms that a 
conviction may not be based upon any 
offense but that charged. 
Reading the Spreigl aod Billstrom decisions 
together. one cannot hclp feeling that the 
Miones<>ta court is mov~ toward a future 
decision which will hold that evidence of any 
other· offenses that is relevant to proof of the 
offense charged is admissible if the defendant 
has notice of the state's intention to offer 
such evidence and if it is not mereJy cumu-
lative and a subteduge for impu.,.oni:o the 
defendant' character". This will be fale even 
though the evidence falls wholly outside the 
traditional exceptions to the exclnsionarf 
rule. The court seems to be preparJng for 
constitutional obje:ctions which will be .raisea 
if the state is allowed to put in evid(!oce proof 
of any other offenses which are rele.\'aJJt to 
proof of the offense charged. 
Accusar/011 of Crime, 41. Minnesota L3w R.-•iew 509. 5 19 
( 1957 J. Professor Seen, in sp~"1king of the permissible 
bceadth of a crimina l indictment. is echoing the. oiled 
tales Sllpre,;ne Court which Jiad said. 
" Conviction upOn. ~ ~ha rge nqt made would ·be a sheer 
dMia.l of. due process." 
Dc,Jong_e v. Oregon , 299 U.S. 353. 362 (1937). 
1 U .S. Const. amend. VT. 
<'1 Supra, note 14. 
20 272 Minn. 488, 139 N .W .2d 167 passim . See espe-
cially the quoted passages from 1 Wigmore, Evidence 
(3d ed. 1940) . 
""1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 205, at 447 (5th 
ed. 1956). Defendant 
". . . can with fa irness be expected to come into court 
prepared to meet accusations contained in the indict-
ment only, a nd, on ibis accoun t. all the evidence of-
fen,d by the p rosecution shi,.ald ~oasi~t wholly of facts 
wlricb are within the range and scope of its alle-
gations." 
~•335 U.S. 469. ~75 (1 94 ). 
" The state may not bow defendant' _ prior trouh1c 
wjUt rhe law. speclfic erjmiJ:ml acts, or ill name 4mong 
hi neighbor,;, evcen though such facts_ might log.ichlly 
be ·per1it1 asise tb:lt ho is by propen.:;ity ·a probable 
pe.rpetrinor of the crime.•· 
"" State v. Jensen, 70 O re. 156. 157, 140 P. 740, 741 
(191 4). With the Spreigf decision Minnesota became the 
first state. to require such notice. 
"'State v. Billstrom, -Minn.-, 149 N.W.2d 281 
(1967) . 
PAD Elects Lethe rt Justice 





Saint Paul, Minn. 
Permit No. 1300 The Pierce Butler chapter of Phi 
Alpha Delta law fraternity has 
elected new officers and drafted a 
program for the 1968-69 school 
year. 
James Lethert, third year, was 
named justice, the top ranking posi-
tion, and James Johnson, third 
year, was named vice justice. 
Other officers named are Byron 
Zotaley, second year, clerk; Bruce 
Eckholm, second year, treasurer; 
and Michael McDonough, second 
year, marshal!. Alan Larson, secord 
year, was elected the fraternity's 
representative on the Student-Fac-
ulty Liaison Committee. 
Nineteen members joined the or-
ganization last fall and 11 entered 
Lethert Johnson 
this spring, Lethert said. The mem-
bership now is about 70. 
The chapter will continue month-
ly luncheons with top speakers and 
hopes to broaden both its profes-
sional and social activities, Lethert 
said. Evening dinner meetings with 
top speakers are being planned. 
The chapter hopes to join with the 
Student Bar Association in organ-
izing a placement program which 
will help students meet prominent 
persons within their field of inter-
est, Lethert said. 
The possibility of a spring 
dinner-dance and a few stag events 
during the year are being ex-
amined, Lethert said. 
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St. Paul, Minn. 55105 
